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Abstract 
 
Along with the World Bank and the IMF, the International Trade Organization (ITO) formed the 
centrepiece of new kind of international organization in the late 40s. At the time, what was 
particularly novel about the Havana Charter was that it was not simply or mainly a trade 
organization like the WTO, its latter day descendent. At its core, the countries of the world, 
rejected the idea that it was possible to maintain a firewall between trade, development, 
employment standards and domestic policy. Its most distinctive feature was the integration of an 
ambitious and successful program to reduce traditional trade barriers, with a wide-angled 
agreement that addressed investment, employment standards, development, business monopolies 
and the like. It pioneered the idea that trade disputes had to be settled by consultation and 
mediation rather than with legal clout. Further it established an institutional linkage between trade 
and labour standards that would effect a major advance in global governance. Finally it embedded 
the full employment obligation, along with  "a commitment to free markets" as the cornerstone of 
multilateralism.    
 
Despite these accomplishments, the US Congress refused to ratify the Havana Charter even 
though it had signed it. As a direct consequence, the ITO's collapse represented a significant 
closure of the full employment era internationally. In the end, it's demise made possible the rapid 
return of the free trade canon that increasingly, would impose its authority and ideology on all 
international organizations and on the practice of multilateralism. As this essay concludes, its 
history compelling because whatever its apparent shortcomings, governments, economists and 
ordinary people demanded that trade, employment goals and developmental needs should 
reinforce each other in the world trading system. 
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Introduction 
 
When the international order was being designed from scratch in the late forties, policy makers 
had to decide whether a global trade organization could be about more than trade, whether it could 
include issues like labour standards, development needs and human rights. Indeed, they had to 
find the optimum structure for such a body in which liberalism, in the words of the Economist, 
would be ‘freed of theology’ and could effect a compromise between market forces and the 
democratic aspirations of people.1 
 
Governments of the day believed it was possible to reconcile the irreconcilable and the Havana 
Charter was the product of their statecraft.2 Since the financial and monetary machinery agreed to 
at the Bretton Woods Conference could not be expected to do all the work, a third international 
organization was needed along side the IMF and the IBRD. These were narrow-band 
organizations with broad regulatory powers to provide short- and long- term finance to stabilize 
the international order. By contrast the ITO was to have special responsibility for the regulation of 
trade, including areas such as tariff reduction, business cartels, commodity agreements, economic 
development and foreign direct investment.  Its fiftieth anniversary has come and gone with no 
major attempt to reevaluate its contribution to global governance. This paper is about those events 
and the transformation in economic thought, international organization and state policy embodied 
in the ITO’s creation and its subsequent decline. They command our interest for three compelling 
reasons:  
 
First with peace looming, countries had to find new ways to maintain exports, compete 
internationally, preserve their exchange rates and fulfill their employment obligations.  Most of 
all, they needed new practices and higher standards that would pave the way for future 
agreements.  The countries of the world also wanted ironclad assurances that tariff reductions and 
other commitments to reform of the world’s trading system would last and not be undermined by 
other more formidable barriers.  Finally, they had to agree to allow their international agreements 
to influence domestic decision-making to a previously unprecedented degree. The question that 
arose then, was how would the ITO effect a compromise between a narrow, rigid legal 
interpretation of trade rules and the need to remove all non-tariff barriers to trade? At a time when 
the WTO is looking for new directions and considering significant kinds of reform, we can 
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identify in the ITO a number of objectives and provisions, which should also be included in the 
WTO.  
 
Secondly, the policy elites at Havana had to strike a balance between expanding trade, enlarging 
investment rights and increasing social protection, concerns that have also shot to the top of the 
agenda in a post-Seattle world. Stamped by the powerful idea that people mattered even more than 
export opportunity, the ITO negotiators sought to embody the radical ideal that liberal trade 
principles should serve the full employment agenda which every industrial country had begun to 
adopt in the closing years of the war, after the British adopted the White Paper on Employment in 
1944. (See Figure, The Rise of the Full Employment Obligation: An Overview of its 
Institutionalization)  
 
With all industrial countries placing ‘a high and stable level of employment’ at the top of their 
policy agendas, the nations of the time needed practical solutions to the issues, many of which are 
still with us. They had to strike a balance between investment rights vs. labour standards; 
developmental needs vs. unrestricted market access; protection of the environment vs. best price 
practice; social protection vs. hard-knuckle economic protectionism. If trade liberalization was to 
be achieved, a new set of principles, not anchored in a classical economic theory that elevated 
comparative advantage as the driver of the world economy, was required. The world community 
seized the opportunity to address the intrusiveness of markets globally. The final design, including 
the many compromises that lead to the founding of the ITO, with its mix of liberal and non-liberal 
principles, continues to have much to instruct us. 
 
Finally, the global economy of the twenty-first century is strikingly different from the heady-days 
of the ITO and it would be foolish to believe that the ITO can serve as a template for reforming 
the WTO. But the story of the ITO does offer an unparalleled case study of a short period in 
history when free trade, labour standards and human development were friends and not historical 
antagonists. Global employment became a public good and the way it was embedded, albeit 
briefly, continues to have echoes down to the present.3. London: Allen Lane. Ltd. Finally, it cannot 
be stressed enough the importance of reading the Havana Charter. The Charter is reproduced in 
Wilcox (1949); see ft.2 supra. A highly important collection of documents on international 
investment has been recently compiled by UNCTAD, United Nations is International Investment 
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Instruments: A Compendium, 3 volumes New York, 1996, UN sales no. E.96.II.A.9   
 
If globalization is to produce benefits for the greatest number, rather than continue to be feared by 
many, we need to be much clearer about the realities, potentialities and limitations of global 
governance.   
 
The first part of the paper explains why the ITO represented a singular moment when ideas, 
institutions and actors shared a common interest and, as Hirshman explains, “created a common 
ground where none existed”, previously. The international effort to create the ITO underlines the 
efficacy of policy ideas, both in changing statecraft and in “their practical value in solving 
political dilemmas that gives them a force in history.”(Ikenberry, 1992:320) The steps taken to 
create the ITO represented a unique occasion when the needs of international civil society and 
modern statecraft coincided. The attempt to fashion the ITO as the ‘regulator of regulators’ sheds 
light on this process.  
 
The second part of the paper, focuses on the way leading trade theorists of the day recast trade 
principles. Like in our own time, economists and other policy experts specializing in international 
trade were at centre stage in designing the new world order. In Dean Acheson’s memorable 
phrase, they were not only ‘present at creation’ but were innovative ‘creators’ whose policy ideas 
gave shape to the institutional and legal framework of this international organization. The 
rebuilding of the world’s trading system took place in the context of the Keynesian revolution that 
transformed economic thinking and state practice. Ideas that transform a discipline or an era or the 
collective psychology of a period are a relatively rare occurrence. Those that succeed only do so 
because at the time the existing orthodoxy is discredited, a powerful, alternative conceptual 
framework can be offered. The new theoretical foundation must be compelling and, critically, 
institutional arrangements must arise to reflect these expectations. It was this condition that turned 
out to be key. 
 
What also makes this complex history so important in terms of the transformation of ideas is that 
the free trade canon of modern economics did not yet exist as a doctrinaire set of first principles, 
even though leading international trade theorists such as Ohlin-Hersherker and Samuelson had 
written brilliant analyses of comparative advantage and international trade by the late forties. 
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(Irwin, 1996) These publications though, were understood as freestanding contributions to a 
rapidly expanding field of research on trade, employment and development. The discipline and 
field of international economics was ‘open’ with many conflicting theories and ideas vying for 
prominence. Kaldor, Meade, Hendersen, Hansen, Myrdal, Schumacher and Viner had all made 
important contributions and many more would follow.4 The point is that the great code of free 
trade theory would have to be invented not in the 1940s, but a decade later by the likes of Harry 
Johnson and others. (Johnson, 1969)  
 
The third part of the paper examines the adequacy of the design of the Havana Charter and ITO. 
Despite its eventual demise, world leaders had learned one searing lesson from the experience of 
the 1930s and the failure of the League of Nations. Solving economic problems required practical 
answers to complex trade, technical and international questions. In an international economic 
organization designed to uphold the new world order, the ITO, or any similar body, would have to 
be more than a set of principles; it could not survive on generalities alone. It had to be an effective 
organization, one that not only addressed many complex issues, but also, one that enabled 
countries to maintain their exports, compete internationally for markets, safeguard their exchange 
rates and fulfill their employment obligations. All of these factors created the demand for new 
international rules to organize the world’s trading system as a practical exercise in statecraft. In 
Meade’s precise words, the ITO had to find the optimum way to internationally  ‘maximize 
production and optimize trade’.    
 
Finally, the paper looks at the short and long run consequences of the ITO’s failure. Even with its 
initial American sponsorship, in the end, it did not survive American trade politics, Destler’s 
evocative term-of-art, to describe the powerful coalitions that dominated US commercial and 
foreign policy. (Odell and Eichengreen, 1998) By 1949, US elites had reached the consensus that 
American interests and investment rights were not well protected in the ITO Charter. What had 
begun as an ‘American project’ did not remain one once the developing countries became 
involved in designing the ITO.  They changed the US agenda. Whatever Washington’s intentions 
were originally, the final product was very different from the script that State Department officials 
had carefully prepared.  In response, the Republican-dominated Congress opposed its ratification. 
So even though the US had gone to Havana and signed the Draft Treaty, by 1950, what had 
seemed a certainty only months earlier, ended in failure.5 Aware of this impending failure, Truman 
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reneged on his Adminstration’s international undertakings and withdrew the statute and US 
support for the ITO.6   
 
That the ITO almost happened is important and this has to be examined carefully. Among its 
many accomplishments is the landmark General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) rules 
that were negotiated as part of the ITO framework. The ITO also brokered the idea that political 
will was more important than rigid legal codes and it established the principle that in the future, 
any viable trade regime with hopes of survival would have to include escape clauses and 
loopholes. Further, it created an open world trading order with scarcely a mention of free trade in 
the Charter or in the GATT. It also recognized the importance of labour standards and the 
developmental needs of the Southern nations in its Charter. Among its other successes, the ITO 
pioneered the idea that trade disputes had to be settled by consultation and mediation rather than 
with legal clout. Finally, it established an institutional linkage between trade and labour standards 
that would effect a major advance in global governance. (Charnovitz, 1995)   
 
Not everything included in the ITO Charter was innovative, indeed much that was contained in it 
reflected the conventional wisdom of the period. But it did have a new vision of political economy 
which suggested that a trade and investment regime had to be more than an abstract set of rigid 
legal principles with which to defend investors’ rights at any price. Along with the World Bank 
and the IMF, it formed the centrepiece of new kind of international organization, which in the 
words of Richard Gardner, ‘sought to make finance the servant, not the master of human desires’ 
internationally. (quoted in Helleiner, 1993:20; Diebold, 1952)  Anything less, even for a brief 
period of time, would not have ensured the work-ability of the new order. 
 
At the time, what was particularly novel about the Havana Charter was that many thought of it as 
an incipient world constitution of trade, employment and development. It is significant that the 
Charter was not simply or mainly a trade organization like the WTO, its latter day descendent. At 
its core, the countries of the world rejected the idea that it was possible to maintain a firewall 
between trade, development, employment standards and domestic policy. Its most distinctive 
feature was the integration of an ambitious and successful program to reduce traditional trade 
barriers, with a wide-angled agreement that addressed investment, employment standards, 
development, business monopolies and the like. 
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Had it succeeded it would have obtained international security of employment as a critical 
benchmark for recasting the principles of trade. Likely, it would have embedded the full 
employment obligation, along with  “a commitment to free markets” as the cornerstone of 
multilateralism.(Ruggie, 1983). As a direct consequence, the ITO’s collapse represented a 
significant closure of the full employment era internationally. In the end, its demise made possible 
the rapid return of the free trade canon that increasingly, would impose its authority and ideology 
on all international organizations and on the practice of multilateralism. 
 
The account that follows attempts presumptuously to revisit this complex history and thus invites 
the reader to challenge many of its assumptions, inconsistencies and findings. Certainly there were 
many more forces at work than can be addressed here. Like any set of commercial negotiations, 
the investment imperative was never far from the centre of the ITO agenda and had remained 
ominously present throughout the lengthy negotiations. However, this history is so compelling that 
whatever its apparent shortcomings, this essay may help shed light on the way governments, 
economists and ordinary people demanded that while building a new and stronger international 
economy, employment goals and developmental needs should reinforce each other. 
 
The Full Employment Obligation Internationally: Context, Setting, and Definition  
 
Early in the War, the allied powers had already begun to plan for peace. They shared a strong 
conviction that never again would inter-war beggar-thy-neighbour monetary and trade policies be 
allowed to bring the international economy crashing to its knees. This concern was so important 
that in 1941, off the coast of Newfoundland, Churchill and Roosevelt met secretly. There they 
jointly agreed that the principle of multilateralism would be the cornerstone of an emergent 
international economic system. Along with this, they pledged an equal commitment to the idea 
that this new international order would give equal weight to increasing the well-being and 
employment prospects for all. This solemn pledge, contained in the Atlantic Charter, may be 
considered the first, irrevocable step toward requiring governments to organize trade 
internationally without sacrificing the prospect for a rising standard of living. The signatories 
pledged “to bring about collaboration between all nations in the economic field.” The Atlantic 
Charter represented the commitment that when peace was restored, the employment needs of 
nations everywhere would be addressed and the international trade order would be reorganized.  
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Article VII of the Anglo-American Lend-Lease Agreement rededicated the Allies to the full 
employment obligation as a global public good. It is worthwhile to recall the precise wording that 
put employment front and centre of the postwar agenda: “the expansion, by appropriate 
international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and 
consumption of goods which are the material foundation of liberty and welfare of all people...” 
Hope for the postwar order lay in the many tasks of reconstruction and the speed with which one 
government after another committed themselves to full employment as the principal and 
“overriding aim of national policy.”(Diebold, 1952:12). 
  
It was not difficult to see why the full employment obligation affected, to the degree it did, the 
work of the drafters of the ITO.  The fifth principle of the Atlantic Charter had called for ‘the 
fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all 
improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security’. The sixth principle 
proclaimed the hope of establishing a peace, ‘which will afford assurance that all men in all lands 
may live out their lives in freedom from want and fear’ Even by 1945, this phrase had already 
entered the twentieth century political lexicon definitively, not only as political rhetoric, or a party 
program or a basic concept of modern economics but, most important, as a standard against which 
the public measured the success or failure of governments. In popular usage, it meant many 
different things: a higher standard of living, job security, mass consumption, industrial citizenship 
and new rights in the workplace secured through a modern collective bargaining system. 
(Armstrong, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1994; Drache and Glasbeek, 1995)  
 
In its generic sense, it referred to policies that governments had to adopt to prevent economic 
depressions and assure social stability, both nationally and internationally. The experience of the 
thirties had taught the world an important lesson, namely, that employment was linked, in a 
variety of ways, “with the outside world.”(Krock, 1973:3) A decade later, every country accepted 
that unemployment had to be addressed at the interstate level; that unemployment and insecurity 
could not be accepted as ‘natural phenomenon’ by governments any longer and that no country on 
its own could solve these problems without addressing its international relations with other states. 
 
For the British and American governments, the re-establishment of  “expansionist, universal and 
multilateral trade” was their long-term goal but they were willing to look at the “less than 
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universal and less than completely orthodox alternatives” that might form a “natural starting point 
for a restructured international order.” Among other things, this consensus meant that, when the 
war ended, it would no longer be acceptable for governments to impose import controls that 
reduced living standards. If no country could afford to go back to the gold standard where 
international trade was controlled by rigid monetary principles, the question to be addressed was, 
how could the world’s countries maintain their economies in balance “without a great excess of 
imports or exports?” Countries needed arrangements which would permit the orderly adjustment 
of exchange rates and the mobilization of credit so that they would not have to rely on deflation as 
a means to correct imbalances. (Ikenberry, 1992: 314)  
 
 The international demand problem of modern economics had pushed Keynes towards his General 
Theory. It convinced him that a new social and political agenda was needed to ensure that the self-
regulating market would not be extended into the international economy, once the war ended. Joan 
Robinson, the doyen of Cambridge radical economic thought, began her influential book, 
Introduction to the Theory of Employment, (reprinted seven times by the 1950s) with these well-
known words: “The modern economic system fails to provide employment continuously for all 
who desire to work....”(Robinson, 1937 and 1969) The consensus that she and Keynes shared was 
that markets did not clear automatically and as complex social constructions, labour markets 
required very different kinds of policies to ensure optimum outcomes. Both Keynes and Robinson, 
had come to the conclusion that the rules of supply and demand bid down the price of labour 
without providing sufficient reason for the private sector to invest in human capital.  Most 
importantly, labour markets would have to provide a sufficient amount of steady employment 
domestically and internationally. 
 
James Meade, the future Nobel Prize Laureate, had come aboard the full employment intellectual 
movement in the 40s with his innovative work on the international dimension of full employment. 
He asked a penetrating set of questions in his authoritative analysis of the balance of payments 
problems and in doing so recast modern trade theory to“cover the domestic aspects of economic 
policies designed for the maintenance of full employment” in order to achieve a socially desirable 
distribution of income and property. (Meade, 1951, vii) He called his work the study of 
‘comparative statics’; in reality, it was more than that. It was an attempt to find the solution to 
international problems either within price theory or by going beyond. His work, like that of so 
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many of his contemporaries, sought to radicalize conventional economics by adding to its 
theoretical core the assertion that international economic development had to facilitate real income 
growth.  One of his most important contributions was to advocate enlarging domestic and 
international demand with a policy of employment at home and an international policy of 
nondiscriminatory trade as desirable objectives in themselves. Building a high import, high export 
economy required that countries find the collective means to maximize their production needs by 
optimizing their trade prospects.  
 
The impetus behind adopting the notion that trade had to serve explicit employment goals came 
only at the end of the war. Kalecki’s seminal notion of full employment capitalism addressed the 
domestic side of the full employment revolution. (1943) In his different writings, he attempted to 
reconcile the historic antagonists of the interwar period,   laissez-faire, free trade capitalism, in 
which workers bore the brunt of international adjustment and the full employment needs of 
workers. What he articulated, in so many words, was that a pledge ‘to create more jobs than there 
were men’, would alter forever the operation of laissez-faire competitive labour markets and 
require the liberal state to transform itself in ways that few could imagine. Kalecki was right about 
the underlying change in state policy that full employment entailed. If workers could not be fired 
without cause, business would be required to plan and anticipate the ups and downs of the 
business cycle. Without the threat of the ‘sack’, the full employment obligation had direct and 
immediate consequences for political leaders and governments internationally. Eventually, it 
would force them to abandon their existing conventional approaches to international organization.7   
 
In retrospect, linking the objective of a much-broadened concept of trade liberalization with an 
unequivocal commitment to the goal of full employment is not all that startling. (Sidelesky, 1994) 
Mass unemployment was the scourge of the interwar period. It overshadowed all other issues and 
concerns, affected the lives of millions of people and was the social problem that finally destroyed 
the last remaining vestiges of legitimacy of the gold standard and laissez-faire free trade. 
Unemployment policy as well as tariff, credit and exchange rate policies had been properly 
regarded as the individual concern of each country.  In Maier’s words, “the iron framework of 
wages, profits, state claims and international payments” would first have to be eased and then 
recast. (Maier,1982:341) 
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For this pivotal reason, the ITO can be understood, as a major break from prewar arrangements in 
which all governments believed that international monetary policy alone was “the glue that binds 
national economies together.”(Eichengreen, 1996) Jacob Viner, a leading advocate of liberal 
principles of trade, was speaking not only for himself when he dismissed the outmoded views of 
the free trader, in his influential 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, in these words: “There are so few 
free traders in the present-day world, no one pays any attention to their views and no person in 
authority anywhere advocates free trade.”(Viner, 1947) Exchange rate stability, that elusive ideal 
of classic liberalism, had meant employment losses and falling wages when Central Banks 
defended the gold standard with a high interest rate policy. The newly minted consensus was that 
in the new world order state-market relations had to be put on a new footing so that governments 
would be insulated from unregulated market pressures in order to pursue a range of goals other 
than short-term commercial gain. 
 
Broadening the Trade Agenda 
 
There is nothing in the history to suggest that the aim of the ITO was to remove all non-tariff 
barriers to trade. That would be wrong because countries do need to employ restrictions, from 
time to time, to address a whole raft of problems, such as balance of payment deficits, promoting 
development and other national and economic problems. (Miskell, 1994) Rather, the framers of 
the detailed trade charter concentrated on removing practices “that gave a competitor in one 
country an unfair advantage over a competitor [in another country] as a consequence of deliberate 
governmental measures.” (Ibid.) For many like Hansen, a pro-ITO supporter, creating a stable and 
effective trade organization could only succeed if a liberal trade policy was “undertaken side by 
side with a program of development, expansion and full employment throughout the world.” 
(Hansen, 1945:1992) 
 
This was a major departure for the newly formed trade organization. In the past, the formation, 
administration and organization of a commercial policy had required only general rules outlawing 
quantitative restrictions and the removal of trade barriers. To restore international trade required 
that the countries of the world plan for trade and define an appropriate set of commercial relations. 
For the drafters of the ITO, broadening the traditional liberal trade agenda entailed a number of 
things. It meant that tariffs and quotas could not be considered separately from the problems of 
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raw materials, economic development, restrictive trade practices and measures to reduce the 
possibility of depressions. Their goal was to create the foundation for a smooth transition to a new 
economic order for many European countries suffering from acute currency shortages while at the 
same time, avoiding  “too many irrevocable commitments” and a code so strict that it would 
require countries to accept “submission to rigid rules.”(Viner, 1947: 626)  
 
Top policy makers also had to decide what levels of trade barriers would be acceptable in the 
postwar period. Would ordinary tariffs be more acceptable than quantitative import restrictions, 
such as import quotas and how would a commitment to dismantling trade barriers be consistent 
with comprehensive, national economic planning?   They had to make the Charter more detailed 
than previous attempts without imposing too many rigid obligations on member states. Finally, the 
negotiators had to devise and agree upon a code that was acceptable to free market-economies, 
state-trading economies and developing economies.8   
 
In terms of enforcement procedures, the ITO had to have final authority if it were to outlaw any 
deviation from its general Code of trade rules. The Charter had to have bite if hard cases of unfair 
trade were to be punished. It also needed to be able to accommodate established patterns of trading 
relations, particularly the preferential system of the Commonwealth, at the same time as being 
flexible enough to address future changes from whatever quarter.  For trade liberalizers such as 
Viner, the Charter passed muster because it was able to supply practical answers on two key 
issues: the effective reduction of quantitative restrictions as well as making nondiscrimination in 
trade a cornerstone of multilateralism. 
 
Liberal trade theory, largely a product of the nineteenth century, could not be expected to supply 
answers to the large and unwieldy agenda facing the countries of the world at the close of World 
War II. (Brown 1950) Recent experiences had taught policy makers that countries would not 
voluntarily drop policies that conflicted with liberal trading principles. So multilateral trade could 
not be made to work if it was premised only on permitting free enterprise and the price system to 
play the largest roles. The thinking in elite circles was that new principles were needed that would 
require states not to consider commercial policy as an end in itself but rather as part of a group of 
policies that assured both social stability and the rapid expansion of the international trading 
system.     
 
14
W.A. Brown, who wrote one of the best-detailed assessments of the ITO Charter in the early 
fifties for the Brookings Institute, captured its essence in his analysis of its guiding principles. 
(Brown, 1950:163-168) Of the ITO’s aims and objectives, only one directly concerned the way in 
which trade should be organized. "To promote on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis 
the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and the elimination of discriminatory treatment 
in international commerce."(Art.1,4) 
    
Article One concerned exclusively the needs of countries for economic development: "To foster 
and assist industrial and general economic development, particularly of those countries which are 
still in the early stages of industrial development, and to encourage the international flow of 
capital for productive investment.” (Art.1,2)  
 
Two dealt with the founding principles of the world order and were comprehensive in intent: "To 
further the enjoyment, by all countries on equal terms, of access to markets, products and 
productive facilities which are needed for their (members') economic prosperity and 
development”; (Art.1,3) and “ to enable countries, by increasing the opportunities for their trade 
and economic development, to abstain from measures which would disrupt world commerce, 
reduce productive employment or retard economic progress." (Art.1,5). 
 
A third linked national prosperity to building an expanding world economy and made it a matter 
of international concern: "to assure a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, to increase the production, consumption and exchange of goods and thus to 
contribute to a balanced and expanding world economy. " (Art.1,1) 
 
Another gave prominence to its co-ordinating role: "to facilitate through the promotion of mutual 
understanding, consultation and cooperation the solution to problems relating to international trade 
in the field of employment, economic development, commercial policy, business practices and 
commodity policy”. (Art. 1,6)  
          
But it was the first sentence that defined the radically new relationship between trade and 
employment that members individually and collectively pledged to undertake: “...the attainment of 
higher living standards, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and 
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development, envisaged in Article 55 of that Charter.” (Art.1) 
 
Whatever the compromises needed to secure the ratification of the Charter at Havana, liberal 
trading principles clearly had not carried the day, either symbolically or substantively. Future 
members of the ITO had affirmed a world trading system with goals of “full and productive 
employment” and agricultural stabilization, planned economic development and reconstruction 
and the maintenance of national security. (Brown, 1950; 166)  Classical free trade liberalism had 
not been bridled by any means, but the first step had been taken ‘to regulate markets beyond the 
state.’ 
 
Not surprisingly, the issue of tariff reduction took on enormous symbolic and political significance 
for the ITO. In the interwar period, efforts to remove trade barriers had failed because trade 
conferences attained agreement only on broad principles and each government was expected to 
comply voluntarily.9  It quickly became apparent that the key to the entire enterprise lay in tariff 
reduction and the elimination of as many tariff and non-tariff barriers as possible.  
 
The removal of discriminatory trade barriers was essential for maintaining a high import-high 
export trading system. It was this act, more than any other single measure that countries might 
negotiate themselves, that was likely to generate jobs in the industrial sector of countries 
characterized by pent-up demand for consumer goods. At the same time, countries could exempt 
sectors that were prone to shed labour (agriculture and textiles being the most likely candidates) or 
industries that were seen as strategic for developmental or other reasons. In this way, the framers 
of the ITO accepted the possibility of limiting their core set of principles to the essential issues of 
trade (including investment), development and employment. Agreeing to recognize diversity and 
asymmetry, rather than uniformity of condition, as the fundamental starting point in framing the 
rules of the new trading order.   
 
They would also recognize the ‘exceptional short-term needs of governments’ through the 
innovative, though high risk, option of safeguard practices and other escape clauses. Anything less 
was unacceptable and any rule-driven liberal-trading regime that was not results-oriented would 
not pass muster with so many developing countries present at the negotiating table. (Miskell, 
1994; Diebold, 1994; Odell and Eichengreen, 1996)  India, the world’s largest democracy, had 
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gained its independence in 1947 and had played an important role among the developing nations 
at the conferences negotiating the ITO charter. Nation building for the developing world required 
political resources and tools that only the state could provide.  
 
In other respects, the Charter could not be expected to settle all the outstanding questions that 
many countries had about the future role of the US in the world’s trading system. What was 
evident, was that emerging welfare states in Western industrialized countries had to be compatible 
with an open trading system and that the investment provisions of the Havana Charter would have 
to be flexible enough for developing countries and for those with a large state planning sector. 
Free traders had appeared to have lost the battle to control investment for their own ends. 
Although this “victory” did not calm fears of many delegates that US trade proposals for the ITO 
were part of an American campaign against the principle of economic planning, in favour of free 
enterprise. In fact, US free traders did succeed in demanding concessions which narrowed the 
ITO's agenda. (Odell and Eichengreen, 1998) These conflicts did not ultimately prevent the 
Havana Charter from being signed after four years of difficult and often acrimonious discussion.10  
It is the comprehensiveness of the text itself which best conveys the internationalism of the period. 
 
Provisions of the Havana Charter 
 
The Charter was a prototypical model agreement for its time, complementing the IMF and the 
World Bank, as envisaged by the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, bolstering public authority 
and opening markets. There were detailed rules not only on the ‘staples of trade’ such as tariffs, 
quotas, exchange controls and state monopolies but on a host of other matters. These reflected the 
newfound consensus that a trade agreement had to be part of “the more constructive policies” that 
governments had to agree to if economic depressions were to be avoided. In addition, the Charter 
addressed rules relating to restrictive business practices, intergovernmental commodity 
agreements, industrial stabilization and international investment, as well as non-tariff barriers. It 
also set out the terms and conditions for release from obligations for economic development; for 
balance-of-payments difficulties; to prevent injury to domestic producers and to form custom's 
unions and free trade areas.  
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In terms of labour standards and full employment guarantees, in addition to the principles already 
discussed, it recognized that labour standards belong in a trade agreement. More specifically, 
Article 7 of the Charter recognized that there were links between core labour standards and trade 
as well as foreign direct investment and employment. It stated that “the Members recognize that 
unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international 
trade...”(Art.7,1) It also included a provision that ILO (International Labour Organization)and ITO 
members “shall cooperate with that organization in giving effect to that undertaking.”(Art.7,2) Its 
most innovative feature was to provide grounds that required unfair labour conditions to be subject 
to a nullification and impairment complaint within the ITO’s dispute settlement procedures (Art. 
94 and 95) (Charnovitz, 1995)  
 
While the ITO did not define a core group of labour standards, it did provide an all-important 
institutional mechanism within the ITO for members and its Executive Board to consider such 
issues. Social dumping, the practice of selling exports below what the costs of production would 
be if international labour standards were followed, had received attention at the UN Conference on 
Trade and Employment, as well as at the World Trade Union Conference held in London in 1945. 
It called for making long-term loans for economic and social development to colonial countries 
“conditional on observance of internationally agreed to working conditions.” Charnovitz argues 
convincingly that the ITO did not endorse the ‘labour standards to aid link’ but, it did connect the 
improvement of labour standards to the larger trade agenda with respect to investment and 
development.  
 
The Charter provided that the ILO and the ITO should “act in close cooperation with each other 
and consult [with] each other regularly in regard to matters of common interest.” Where violations 
occurred, countries could bring their complaints to the Executive Board for remedy. To underscore 
the importance accorded the ILO, by the ITO Charter, the ILO was allowed the right to participate 
in ITO meetings. This partially fulfilled Roosevelt’s wartimes promise that the ILO would have an 
essential part to play in rebuilding a “stable international system of social justice for all peoples”. 
(Alcock, 1971:169) 
 
The thinking at the time was that the articulation of workers rights had to be an integral part of 
trade and commercial policy. Investors were to receive their due but not at the exclusion of other 
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concerns. Capital's rights were to be safeguarded and so the emphasis in the Charter was to find 
the middle ground in this and other matters. Governments recognized that labour rights were in 
their common interest and that countries had “to establish a balance of mutual advantage” in 
advancing their trade and employment goals. Commodity policy and business practices had to be 
reinforcing so as to "contribute to the expansion of production, trade and employment."  
 
In addition to these provisions, industrialized countries committed themselves to other general 
principles of conduct that directly would enhance employment-creating policies. With respect to 
employment, for instance, positive commitments towards employment were largely voluntary and 
left to the discretion of member states. Provisions concerning employment-creation were put in 
very general terms creating a ‘high standard’ but no formal legal obligation. (Diebold, 1952:12)  
 
Even with such a low minimum, members were permitted to take safeguard “actions within the 
provisions of the charter” should other members fail to comply with these commitments. The 
crucial clause in favour of full employment policy was related to cases where the quantitative 
restriction ban would be lifted. This was an innovative provision even if it remained a solution of 
last resort.11 As well, in terms of state policy, a highly complex procedure allowed member states 
to impose quantitative restrictions to avoid deflationary trends in cases of severe currency crises or 
even for broader objectives, such as "the achievement and maintenance of full and productive 
employment" (art. 21.(b)) 
 
In the area of international market forces as regulators of international life, trade barriers had to be 
reduced and wherever possible eliminated. The rules for adjudicating disputes as well as the 
mechanism for constructing a system that was both rules-driven and sensitive to outcomes was 
spelled out in detail. These complex rules had been negotiated at Geneva, in 1947, as an essential 
part of the preparatory work of the ITO.12  (Jackson, 1989: 32-39) The important point here was 
that countries had to have legal recourse to take exceptional measures when they faced unusual 
short-term conditions that threatened their economies. The extent and nature of these ‘escapes’ 
were spelled out in the GATT rules and they were accepted by all governments, including 
Washington and the UK, as an essential component of establishing a nondiscriminatory system of 
trade. Without these exemptions it would not have been possible to ban the use of other barriers 
which, Ostry underlines, were also a part of the GATT. (Ostry, 1997:68) It was better to have 
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modest safety valves than outright protectionist policies. While the Havana Charter was very 
broad in scope, a close reading of the text suggests that the chapter on disputes resolution and 
unfair trading practices was designed explicitly to impose a much stricter code of discipline on 
members. In addition to its lofty principles, the Charter had a lot of market muscle to address 
contentious trading issues. It envisaged that the GATT was to become the police of the new 
organization.  
 
In the area of international economic regulation, its jurisdictional scope included power to make 
recommendations and to promote agreements ‘to facilitate an equitable distribution of skills, arts, 
technology, materials and equipment’ to assure just and equitable treatment for the enterprise, 
skills, capital, arts and technology brought from one Member country to another’ and to ‘avoid 
double taxation’. (Picciotto, 1998) It included a chapter requiring states to prevent enterprises 
from engaging in practices restraining competition, limiting access to markets, or fostering 
monopolistic control, and it set up a procedure for investigating and reporting on specific 
complaints about such practices. (UNCTAD 1996-I:3) 
 
Combatting protectionism required that quantitative measures such as import quotas, quantitative 
restrictions and import duties should be disallowed to the maximum extent possible. In an 
imperfect world, countries everywhere employed export subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and 
commodity agreements to discriminate against their competitors. The United States had import 
quotas on wheat, wheat flour and cotton, as authorized under section 22 of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act. (Brown, 1950: 25)  As well, it had separate import quotas on raw and refined 
sugar which were incompatible with the Charter’s provisions and would have had to be abolished. 
Changes would also have had to be made to the Philippines Trade Act, in order to put both 
countries into conformity with Charter requirements. France had special relations with its colonies 
based on a discriminatory trade relations, while the UK relied on the Imperial Trading 
Preferences. All of these special relationships would have to be altered and abandoned in due 
course, as they were, in fact, by the early sixties. But in the Charter all these exceptions were 
‘grand-fathered’.  
 
Another group of trade norms and principles were addressed under the category of special 
circumstances, that is, times when a country could not implement the principles of the Charter due 
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to a 'drastic and sudden change in existing trade practices.' It was entitled to relief though 
negotiation or a transitional period after which conformity was required. Here too, the Charter 
could hardly be considered radical in permitting this kind of escape clause. It had already been 
agreed to at Geneva when the GATT was negotiated. More importantly, US trade law recognized 
that its trade authorities had discretionary power to “suspend, withdraw or prevent the application 
of concessions to carry out a trade agreement” which were interpreted to be discriminatory, 
restrictive or burdensome for US commerce. 
 
For developing countries, new ground was broken with respect to price volatility as it affected the 
production and trade in primary commodities such as mining and agricultural products. Both 
developing and industrialized countries agreed to establish procedures for temporary 
intergovernmental commodity agreements based on a regulation of price and production though 
excluding buffer stocks. (Chapter 6) The aim was to bring price and revenue stability for primary 
producers and consumers. At the time this provision was path-breaking. The collapse of primary 
products had affected all countries severely in the interwar period and the Charter attempted to 
provide a practical alternative that would permit and encourage marketing boards and other 
market-limiting institutions. In addition, special provisions were designed to guarantee an 
effective support for the agricultural sector through subsidies and quantitative restrictions. (art.20, 
22,27)    
 
Finally, the investment provisions of the Charter were, by far, the most controversial. They 
implicitly recognized the right of expropriation of host countries and entitled them to impose 
specific requirements on foreign direct investment. Host countries could take any ‘appropriate 
important measures’ to prevent foreign direct investment from interfering in their domestic policy. 
Countries would be entitled to permit or refuse future investment and regarding nationalization, 
the host country’s right was implicitly recognized and payment of compensation was 
acknowledged. (art.12) These special provisions to promote economic development were designed 
“particularly for those countries which (were) in the early stage of industrial development.” 
(chap.3) At the insistence of developing countries this principle was given a very broad reading 
including, tariff preferences, quantitative restrictions and limitation of investor’s rights.  
 
Still,  the far-reaching issue of host rights vs. investor obligations was hardly resolved. (see Fifty 
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Years of Regulating Foreign Investment 1948- 1998). In reality, the ITO conferences 
demonstrated that there was an absence of international consensus on this crucial issue.  The 
combined opposition from Latin American, Indian and Australian delegations opposed the 
sweeping definition of traditional international property rights as defined by the US Congress. The 
US demand for an unambiguous  commitment to protect the investments of international business 
from the incipient Organization was rejected in the Final text.13Latin American countries turned to 
other avenues to pursue these issues in the UN. In 1952, at the height of US Cold War power, the 
General Assembly passed the first resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 
The resolution endorsed the right of all states to nationalize and exploit their natural resources. 
The final resolution affirmed the right of member states to “have the due regard, consistent with 
their sovereignty...the need for maintaining the flow of capital in conditions of security.” Still for 
others, the formation of UNCTAD, often called the developing countries GATT, had its origins in 
the end of the ITO. Almost all of the same concerns and many of the provisions present in the 
development decade framework document can be traced to this  pioneering multilateral forum. 
Continuity was provided by no less than Raoul Prebisch who was at both the London Conference 
as well as at Havana, where the text was finalized. As his own correspondence reveals, he was 
profoundly marked by this experience. He was to play a major role in drafting the UN’s 
development decade. Issues such as the need to balance foreign direct investment with the 
asymmetrical needs of developing countries, the importance of price stabilization measures, the 
need for escape clauses were folded into the UN’s Development Decade of the sixties.  Ed 
Dosman, York University, is completing an intellectual biography of Prebisch and has in his 
possession much documentary evidence showing just how influenced Prebisch was by the attempt 
to create the ITO. For the text establishing the developmental decade, see B. Stern,  Un Nouvel 
Ordre Economique International? Recueil de Textes et Documents. Paris: Economica, 1983.   
 
Clair Wilcox, one of the US negotiators at London, Geneva, and Havana, prepared a Reader's 
Guide to the Havana Charter which captured the full flavour of this seminal agreement.  
 
Barriers to trade, other than tariffs, should be eliminated or minimized; tariffs should be 
reduced and preferences outlawed; trading areas should be widened by forming customs 
unions and free trade areas; member states should not discriminate against other member 
states; state trading operations should be governed by the principles that apply to private 
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trade; subsidies should not be used to obtain more than a fair share of the world market; 
international trade should not be restrained by public or private monopolies or cartels; 
economic development and reconstruction will expand world trade and increase real 
income; international private investments will promote economic development; the use of 
protective measures to promote economic development may be justified; members should 
consider the effect of their trade policy on others and consult with them. (Wilcox, 1949: 
223-4)  
 
What made the Charter unique and a step forward as an international body to regulate trade was 
that its design and principles were intended to provide all countries with a way to adapt and adjust 
to competitive pressures without having to sacrifice modern goals of equity and social justice. 
Organizationally this spirit of equality was also manifested. In the ITO, major decisions by the 
member states would be based on ‘sovereign equality’ rather than weighted-voting as in the case 
of the IMF and the World Bank.  Democratic governance at the international level demanded 
recognition and extension of majority voting rather than elite control by the few. 14  
 
So as long as the ITO could make it the interest of every major country to eschew protectionist 
and deflationary practices, then, the new international order presided over by the ITO would be 
very different from its liberal antecedents, just as Keynes, from Britain and Harry Dexter White, 
from the US, the two intellectual leaders who had challenged financial liberalism in the 30s, had 
predicted. Freed from the sterile debates of the past, a non-liberal approach to investment and 
development matters had begun. 
 
Was the Design Adequate to the Task? 
 
For extreme advocates of laissez-faire internationalism in the US, the Charter transgressed the 
fundamental notion that trade was principally organized for private gain and profit and that it had 
to be fully competitive, subject only to moderate barriers such as tariffs for revenue or industrial 
protection.15 The failure of the ITO to find sufficient support in the court of US legislative opinion 
should not be allowed to hide its most important achievement. A Charter for world trade always 
raises the fundamental questions of how to balance two potentially conflicting agendas: big-
picture ideas, that is, the principles and guiding beliefs (without which none of the Bretton Woods 
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organizations would have been able to see the light of day) with the pragmatic details of the legal 
text, including the all-important minutiae of regulation, complex trade rules and other measures to 
enhance export opportunity and maximize import openness. It is this model of international 
organization that has been improved upon but never abandoned. 
 
In the untested Charter, the ITO’s blend of Keynesian demand principles with a well-thought plan 
for freer trade between developing and developed nations provided a pragmatic way to reconcile 
the historic antagonists of the interwar period and begin to address the new challenges of 
development and decolonization. The dynamic that led to the Havana Charter would have been 
unthinkable without the presence and active participation of the developing nations of the world. It 
was their influence which transformed a rather modest US-UK initiative into a broad-based 
proposal to put trade, money, investment, employment and development on a radically new 
footing.   
 
The consensus embodied in the Havana Charter was path breaking for the nations of the world 
also because it created the template for all other similar broad initiatives. Some fifty countries had 
produced a framework document combining a statement of intent with practical measures, set a 
fixed timetable to attack quantitative restrictions and established the broad principles and a 
realistic set of procedures to get there that included a dispute resolution mechanism and a massive 
reduction in tariffs. The innovative idea that inspired the ITO was that no country nor powerful 
business lobby nor trade union ever wants to be tied to an inflexible set of rules that did not let 
countries protect themselves from the short-term difficulties of adjustment that lead to loss of jobs 
or markets or both when faced with sharp swings of the business cycle. When the Charter 
provided a sufficient number of escape clauses, in the GATT, that recognized the diverse needs of 
countries at different stages of development, it struck the proper balance of serving both the 
developmental needs of Latin American and Asian countries, as well as the short-term needs of 
the industrial world.  
 
Many of the escape clauses were drawn from US practice and US trade legislation which should 
have guaranteed its passage through the US Congress.16 In the end it did not, but, more importantly 
all countries kept these provisions in the mini-Havana Charter of the GATT. However, in another 
way, the GATT language of Article XIX with respect to safeguard mechanism remained quite 
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ambiguous with a highly contingent set of criteria.17 
 
In other ways the brief existence of the ITO ensured the future of the world trading order. The 
deals made at Geneva in 1947, under its fledgling trade arm, the GATT, gave the postwar trading 
system a badly needed lift off.18 Its prestige and authority made possible the single largest tariff cut 
ever -- some $10 billion worth of trade at prewar prices involving 45,000 concessions were made 
with the backing of the US Congress that authorized the President to cut tariffs up to 50 percent.  
(Curzon and Curzon, 1969:57) The value of world trade increased some 360 percent from 1947 to 
1966. No subsequent tariff negotiations, until the development decade of the sixties, ever 
exceeded the work of the ITO.19 (See table, Growth of World Trade1900- 1990) It was one of the 
largest stimulatory measures ever undertaken, designed both to promote domestic growth and 
create jobs by reducing barriers to trade. Here was demonstrable proof of Meade’s virtuous cycle 
linking trade, production and employment-creation as mutually reinforcing.  
 
In ways that few have grasped, tariff-reduction became the ideal instrument to promote 
international Keynesianism, a perfect match to support the same political imperative domestically. 
No wonder the architects of the ITO believed that they had reconciled international trade 
reciprocity with an equally far-reaching commitment to provide employment for everyone who 
needed it. Tariff reduction carried the day not just for liberal ends, but for the all-important reason 
of building a different kind of international order. In it, politics and economics were no longer 
treated as separate watertight compartments.     
 
In other ways, too, the ITO set the agenda for the next five decades. There was no other equivalent 
moment when the countries of the world rewrote the rules and practices in such an extensive and 
innovative way. Practical issues such as non-tariff barriers, improvements to the antidumping 
code, as well as, state trading practices which had been part of the Havana Charter were finally 
addressed in the Kennedy Round. But, by then, multilateral tariff bargaining was no longer as 
revolutionary a method as it had been in 1947. 
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Looking Back-Looking Forward: the End of the Story 
 
The ITO had a bold plan to build a social market globally because it set out to create a common 
ground between the full employment obligation that had shot to the top of the agenda throughout 
the industrial world and the developmental needs of the Southern nations in the emerging world. 
In the rear-view mirror of history one large and very powerful idea stands out. The framework 
agreement for this new age could not be a system of pure commercial gain designed to advance 
the free enterprise principle at any cost. This made impeccable economic sense, as well as, smart 
statecraft. When economic growth stalled, few countries would accept the dictates of crude market 
logic to open their economies, regardless of the cost and despite the consequences. So the public 
and private domain required a new division of labour and regulation at the international level. The 
Havana Charter was the defining moment, recasting the relationship between trade, development 
and employment. Its disappearance left a cavernous hole in the architecture of the postwar 
institutions of global governance in five critical areas: labour rights and standards, dispute 
settlement and interpretation, the international price for primary commodities, the regulation of 
transnational business and on governments themselves. By comparison, the GATT had only 
residues of the non-liberal characteristics that had stamped the ITO as an organization.    
 
First, the ITO provisions on fair labour standards were not included in the GATT. Charnovitz 
notes that “except for the provision in Article XX(e) that permits governments to ban trade in 
goods produced using prison labour, GATT says nothing about labour standards.”(Charnovitz, 
1995:171) The original intent was that labour standards were covered not through the GATT but 
were to be given a more important and legitimate place within the general framework of the ITO. 
Without the ITO there was no institutional place for labour standards in the GATT nor later in the 
WTO. 
 
Secondly, the Havana Charter had an explicit provision that its members had the authority to make 
legal and binding interpretations of the Charter. This was crucial because with this power, the ITO 
had the authority to establish what Jackson calls ‘joint action’ that would not only facilitate the 
operation of the new organization but would further the objectives of the Agreement and allow it 
to grow and adapt to the changing international economy. 
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Internationally, organizations that explicitly give their charters such power to make legal and 
binding findings are preferred to those which can only ‘recommend’ compliance. In the case of the 
ITO, interpretation and dispute settlement decisions carried with them a binding treaty obligation 
even when its member states disagreed with a decision because it was unfavourable to their 
immediate interests. (Jackson 1989:90) The penalty for noncompliance entailed sanctions, the 
principal one being suspension of trade concessions.   
 
By contrast, GATT had no such provision. It had no binding interpretative powers once the ITO 
was stillborn. In terms of international law setting norms, the GATT had no requirement,  as had 
the ITO,   that all countries had to use their dispute resolution procedure exclusively. Havana had 
broken new ground because it permitted reference to the International Court of Justice, in some 
matters.  Appeal to the Court was needed because in the words of Clair Wilcox, the vice-chair of 
the US Delegation to the Havana Conference, “it provided for the development of a body of 
international law to govern trade relationships.”(Ibid., 93) Without the power of formal binding 
interpretation, the GATT’s dispute settlement mechanism was voluntary and thus could be ignored 
largely without penalty thus making new legal norms difficult to establish.20Under GATT rules, a 
contracting party was not obligated to accept an amendment which it opposed. Here too, the 
retreat from the ITO’s provisions for a New World trading order with muscle was marked. 
 
Thirdly, for the developing countries of the world, the end of the ITO created a multitude of 
problems. It had provided a framework to stabilize the international price of primary commodities. 
It also saw the need for producers to work together to market primary products. This was lost 
when the ITO failed. In terms of investment rules, the pivotal idea of the Charter was that a new 
investment regime could only succeed on the condition that countries dismantle state-erected 
barriers and enforce a code regulating the restrictive practices of international business. The two 
went together. The key was that investors’ rights could not be so broad as to limit host country’s 
responsibilities. In the Charter, no member was precluded from enforcing any national statute to 
prevent what was at the time called “monopoly practices” (Art.52) 
 
The word monopoly practices meant something quite explicit to the assembled negotiators at 
Havana. They were prepared to accept the fact that there were many trade-distorting activities that 
impaired markets from effective functioning. Some were state-centred, many more came from 
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international business. What was needed was a framework for a new investment regime with a 
strong pro-active capacity to hold foreign direct investors and multinational corporations 
accountable to international authority.  
 
This was the pivotal idea that struck a deep chord with many countries, both developed and 
developing. Even if many of their recommendations were not as strong as they might have been, 
the Havana negotiators understood that unregulated concentration in capital-exporting activities 
such as telecommunications, insurance, banking, mining and pharmaceutical sectors, posed an 
immediate threat to the orderly development of the international system. Here too, states had to be 
able to act to defend their interests and use their power of expropriation. This is why the 
developing world saw in the Final Text signed at Havana such a positive beginning. 
Developmental inequalities were to be addressed within a non-liberal framework. It would take 
more than a decade for the developing nations of the world to make economic and social planning 
the centre of the development decade of the sixties.  
 
Fourthly and uniquely, the Havana Charter not only applied to governments but also to the actions 
of private firms whose restrictive business practices threatened to undermine the liberal goal of 
nondiscriminatory trade. The ITO contained a whole chapter on anti-competitive practices. In 
contrast, the GATT included none of that language.  
 
Finally, indeed, with the end of the ITO, GATT members opposed any steps for regulating the 
intra-company trade, to set bright-line standards for multinationals or, in any way, to impose any 
obligations on international private actors. Led by the US and others, the GATT Contracting 
Parties decided not  “to bring this subject under GATT” but only provide for limited consultations. 
(Jackson, 1989:212)  
 
Restrictive business practices were explicitly excluded from GATT procedures and were not a 
subject covered by its disputes mechanism. (Article XXIII) In short, only governments would be 
subject to international regulation, not multinationals.21 This more than any other provision 
marked a dramatic turnabout from the public objectives embodied in the ITO; that private 
authority no less than state actors had to be accountable to international law.  By contrast, the 
GATT chose to be silent on the monopolistic practices of powerful transnational actors. The 
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rupture with the ITO was complete. 
 
A Final Word 
 
The end of the ITO transformed the fabric of the post-World War II international economic 
organizations. Without this one non-liberal institution and its provisions to limit international 
markets, global markets quickly found a new political legitimacy that none of the signatories at 
Havana could have anticipated. The governments who signed the Charter had thought that it was 
possible to regulate markets outside of the state but, in 1949, they failed. In the end the ITO was a 
victim of Cold War politics, shifting US priorities, a protectionist Congress and elites that 
preferred not to have a strong world trade organization with non-liberal principles and goals. 
Embedded liberalism was, at best, a second best option. It gave a more limited role to state 
interventionism and by contrast, a very large play to international market needs. 
 
In his important study of the spread of Keynesian ideas, Peter Hall makes the general point that for 
the time the linking of trade, employment and social policy constituted a revolution in state policy 
making.(Hall, 1989) For the next five decades, the frontier between the state and the market was 
definitively redrawn and the division of their roles permanently altered, as witnessed by the 
growing responsibility of the state in the economy.(Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998) The proof was 
that the ideas of international regulation, full employment, development and nondiscriminatory 
trade had conquered world economic thought but not the GATT and the world trading order post-
ITO.22  
 
As states everywhere feel the adaptive pressures from global free trade and the powerful legal 
code of the WTO, they would do well to take a long hard look again at the Havana Charter for 
both its strengths and its shortcomings. The legacy of Havana presents a challenge of epic 
proportions for triumphant liberalism.  
 
It was a potent international instrument that could, in due course, have established new 
international standards. It was also a highly normative exercise in trade politics that recognized 
that foreign direct investment and full employment were indispensable for the stability of the 
international economy.  One of the ITO’s fundaments was that foreign direct investment was not 
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an absolute, rather it had to be acceptable to the host country. Another was that labour standards 
and human rights belonged in a trade organization. The ITO championed the principle that 
countries had the responsibility to manage job loss when it occurred, along with the obligation to 
restructure their economies when business failures threatened to undermine the benefits from 
increased trade. Both these policy imperatives prevented an immediate return to an embedded 
laissez-faire free trade regime.  
 
In the fifties and later the sixties, with pro-labour oriented governments elected to office in 
Western Europe, Canada and Australia, policymakers sought to capitalize on these new planning 
techniques to provide jobs for everyone. The rise of the modern welfare state and the transition 
from a wartime to a peace time economy meant that national markets grew in new and dramatic 
ways and joblessness reached historic lows. Elected government's quickly developed international 
strategies with a complementary set of collective bargaining institutions at home that supported 
expanded trade. (Rodrik, 1997) To do this they adopted social insurance and safety nets that built 
support at home for trade liberalization while pursuing full employment strategies or goals. Thus 
they found it easy to square the circle, social protectionism did not hurt the economy very much 
and, indeed, made the economy more efficient. Public policymakers also quickly discovered that 
trade generates a lot of gains only when the domestic economy is growing rapidly and the state 
intervenes to ease the burden of adjustment. This is why the pursuit of purely commercial 
advantage today holds even less allure than the proponents of free trade proclaim.    
 
With capital more mobile than ever and domestic economic growth weak, building 
counterweights, one of the central ideas that lead to the Havana Charter and the ITO, has to be at 
the top of the world agenda today.  The advanced countries have always favoured national 
controls over their own resources and strategic sectors and have never abandoned state aids and 
subsidies to support their home industries. This is why there have been so few successful 
worldwide efforts to protect foreign investors rights from the reach of nations.  And this is also 
why a strategy of expanding trade requires strengthening such social institutions as unemployment 
insurance, education, training and a comprehensive social policy. No less an authority than the 
OECD describes the current jobs crisis “as the most widely feared phenomenon of our times.” 
Once again free trade is the nemesis of the full employment obligation.  
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Whatever its shortcomings, the ITO, the practical embodiment of the full employment revolution 
in state practice internationally, was as good as it gets. The ITO was a remarkable organization 
that pioneered the idea of an integrated trade and employment organization, not a specialized one 
like the WTO. Despite its short, but significant, existence it nevertheless set the international trade 
agenda for years afterwards. It was the highwater mark of the only international trade organization 
that effectively rewrote the fundamentals. ‘Trade and economic endeavour should be conducted 
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of 
the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods.’ These words are taken from the 
preamble to the GATT, a final bit of evidence of the way the world of trade and employment was 
envisaged when the ITO was in its heyday. Belated happy 50th birthday Havana. 
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The Rise of the Full Employment Obligation: An Overview of Its Institutionalization 
 
1941   Atlantic Charter Article IV - VI sets the stage for future international negotiations on 
the links between national recovery, the international economic order and security. 
The fifth principle called for ‘the fullest collaboration between all nations in the 
economic field with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, 
economic advancement and social security’. The sixth proclaimed the hope of 
establishing a peace ‘which will afford assurance that all men in all lands may live 
out their lives in freedom from want and fear’ 
1941  Roosevelt addresses the ILO December Washington meeting and promises the ILO 
delegates that their Organization will play an essential part in building up a stable 
international system of social justice for all peoples everywhere. 
1941  Lord Keynes to Treasury where his ideas on full employment begin gain influence 
and acceptance and he takes part in discussions on the postwar order in Washington 
1942  Beveridge’s report on Social Security in a postwar world published incorporating the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter and signalling the new role for labour in public 
policy making 
1942  Article VII Lend-Lease commits US and UK to begin to search for new principles 
for rebuilding the world’s trading system 
1942  James Meade writes a Proposal for an International Commercial Union calling for 
‘far-reaching and imaginative proposals for the reduction of restrictions to 
international commerce’; top civil servants preoccupied with working on the 
proposal 
1943  Interdepartmental and inter-agency committees meet continuously in Washington 
from the spring of 1943 to summer of 1945 chaired successively by Acheson and 
Clayton; also talks with Canadian officials 
1943  ‘New Dealers’ in Department of State begin to prepare the draft treaty proposing the 
ITO; eventually they loose control of the agenda 
1943  First UK/US postwar planning negotiation related to Article VII in Washington  
1944  US Employment Bills: full employment commitment watered down. Congress 
refuses to follow the UK example 
1944  UK White Paper on Full Employment/followed by Canadian and Australia White 
Papers on Employment 
1944  The Economist Restructuring the World Trading System, a series of six articles on 
trade, employment and the design of the commercial order 
1944  Schumacher publishes a major statement on trade and employment as Fabian 
pamphlet; Hayek’s book Road to Serfdom appears in print 
1944  ILO Philadelphia Convention on full employment policies  
1944  Finance Ministers at Bretton Woods meetings establish the IMF and the World Bank 
including full employment obligation to be included in their original mandates. The 
ITO was to be established later and the ‘essential’ third pillar to over the new trading 
system for the world 
1944  Brynes  replaces Hull as Secretary of State; free trader Clayton nominated Under-
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
1945  Alvin Hansen, key economic advisor to the President, publishes influential volume, 
America’s Role in the World Economy 
1945  UK Labour victory 
1945  Britain negotiates a $5 billion loan from Washington and US officials insist on 
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committing UK on joint proposals for establishing the ITO 
1945  Australia elects a labour government under Chifley, a strong advocate of the tariff 
for national development and ITO, World Bank and full employment goal 
internationally 
1946  First meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the ITO, October 15 to November 26 
in London;  representatives of 18 countries have exploratory talks on the ITO on US 
Proposals for the Expansion of World Trade and Employment 
1946  France establishes national planning under Jean Monnet 
1947  Joint GATT ITO meetings at Geneva; successful tariff negotiations make possible 
non-tariff measures to be included in Havana Charter      
1947  US initiates Marshall Plan to support European reconstruction and a rival agenda to 
the ITO 
1947  Britain nationalizes its coal industry 
1947  India becomes the world’s largest democracy and independent from Britain 
1947  Jacob Viner, leading US trade authority, declares support for the ITO  in Foreign 
Affairs, a leading US forum of opinion and expert advice 
1947  UN Conference on Trade and Employment is opened in Havana, November 18; 56 
nations send delegations. A great deal of criticism of Geneva text that it was one-
sided and served the interests of the major industrial powers and not the developing 
countries. 
1948  The US sponsors the creation of the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC) to promote trade liberalization and the further reduction of 
barriers. 
1948  US Congressional elections return a Republican US Congress hostile to many ITO 
provisions  
1948     Havana Conference, final text is signed by 53 countries on March 24. Includes major 
chapters on trade policy, cartels, commodity agreements, employment, economic 
development and international investment and the constitution of a new UN 
institution in international trade  
1949  Report on National and International Measures To Achieve Full Employment 
published by the UN’s Economic and Social Council Group of Experts among them 
Kaldor. 
1949  Chifley’s ‘Light on the Hill’ address recommits Australia to full employment 
1949  ITO Treaty is submitted to Congress, not voted on 
1950  US abandons the ITO. A coalition of protectionists and perfectionists, critics of the 
Charter, convinces Truman to withdraw the draft treaty from Congress. 
1950   US Congress so hostile that President Truman signs GATT as an executive order; 
not submitted to Congress    
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    Fifty Years of Regulating Foreign Investment 
      1948- 1998  
 
The Havana Charter in 1948 is signed by more than fifty countries and affirms the rights of 
investors to fair treatment, emphasizes the importance of foreign investment flows for 
development and reconstruction as well as protecting the host country’s right to develop national 
resources for national ends. Different articles pronounce in favour of countries taking domestic 
measures against restrictive business practices including nationalization with compensation while 
at the same time requiring states to dismantle barriers to trade.  
 
In 1952 at the height of US cold war power, the General Assembly passes its first resolution on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural resources. The resolution endorsed the right of all states to 
nationalize and exploit their natural resources. The final resolution affirms the right of member 
states “have the due regard, consistent with their sovereignty...the need for maintaining the flow of 
capital in conditions of security.” 
 
In the 1960s the principle of permanent sovereignty over national resources is declared in General 
Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) no. 3. (1962) The principle affirms the rights of nations to 
control their natural resources and represents the high water mark to find common ground between 
the developed and developing countries. The resolution also provides for appropriate 
compensation when resources are nationalized.  
 
1961 - Codes of Liberalization of Capital Movements and of Current Invisible Operations 
establishes binding rules and provides effective machinery for their gradual expansion and 
implementation by OECD countries. 
 
1967 - OECD developed countries negotiate a Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Private Property and is approved by the Organization’s Council but is never opened for signature. 
 
1970 - Decision 24 of the Andean Pact imposes stringent controls and screening procedures on 
FDI and the transfer of technology including a provision requiring the disinvestment of foreign 
firms after a number of years. 
 
1974 - The Decade To Establish a New Economic Order. International activity is focused on 
host country’s demands for economic independence and national control over TNCs and the UN 
passes the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The rights belong to newly 
developing countries and the ‘duties’ to multinational firms and advanced industrial states. One 
hundred and twenty nations voted for it; ten abstained and the United States, United Kingdom, 
West Germany, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg voted no. The charter effectively permits 
national efforts to restrict and control foreign investment throughout the Third World including 
expropriation, contract abrogation and the use of municipal courts to settle disputes.   
 
1976 - OECD takes the lead and adopts a Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises that includes a voluntary set of guidelines for MNEs Among other 
things, it calls for assurance of national treatment,  addresses problems of incentives and 
disincentives and proposes an easing of performance requirements on TNCs. This and other 
instruments provide the key elements of a emerging liberal framework for states in the developed 
world.   
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1981 - WHO pioneers a code of International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes in the 
area of consumer protection. This is one of several initiatives taken to protect consumers from 
TNCs and set new standards for corporate behaviour. 
 
1983 - An extensive UN Code on the conduct of TNCs is proposed but the instrument is never 
adopted despite agreement on many of its provisions. 
 
1986 - ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning MNEs and Social Policy is adopted 
even if only voluntary. 
 
1985 -World Bank is in the forefront of reversing the early trend set by the developing countries 
in proposing radical changes in the making of national investment laws. It sponsors the 
Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency that, among other things, 
leaves investors free to transfer their profits and capital out of the host country. 
 
1991 - OECD Council of Ministers reviews the OECD instruments on TNCs and agrees on a 
number of changes to strengthen them. 
 
1992 - The World Bank prepares and proposes the non-binding Guidelines on the Treatment of 
Foreign Direct Investment that will be a benchmark in augmenting protection for foreign direct 
investment rights. 
 
1991 - Andean Countries amend their previous instrument on foreign investment and replace it 
with a liberal set of regulations – a major reversal of policy. They now relax rules regarding 
foreign investment in host country. 
 
1993 - NAFTA . A path-breaking agreement that serves as the prototype for other agreements 
internationally. Chapter 11 goes further than anyone anticipated in dismantling barriers to foreign 
investment; in affirming non-discriminatory pricing practices in the management of resources and 
in extending national presence and national treatment to US investors. It particularly limits 
Mexico and Canadian governments’ ability to nationalize or expropriate.  
 
1994 - The Uruguay Round is successfully completed with its path-breaking agreement on 
Trade-related Investment Measures and Trade-related Property Rights. Specific commitments 
cover market access and national treatment. Most developing countries have had little experience 
with issues related to the liberalization of foreign direct investment and trade in services. 
 
1994 - Final Act of the European Energy Charter Treaty proposes new investment rights and 
protection for private investors. 
 
1994 - APEC’s Non-Binding Investment Principles adopted supporting foreign direct investment 
and new protection for investors. 
 
1997 - Over 1,300 bilateral investment treaties have been signed but there is still no 
comprehensive agreement -- the goal that eludes the OECD for more than a quarter of a century. 
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1997-8 - the MAI-OECD Treaty is negotiated by 28 developed countries responding to the 
coverage of financial services in the Uruguay Round. It is a framework agreement to promote a 
liberalized investment regime  and provide an effective dispute settlement mechanism. Some 
reservations are permitted for national security, subnational measures and cultural protection. But, 
it is the most comprehensive set of measures ever proposed to enlarge investors rights and has 
immediate consequences for national governments in many policy domains. Defeated in the US 
Congress and by a world wide campaign against the anti-MAI organized by social movements 
with utilizing the world-wide net and other modern communication technologies. 
  
from International Investment Instruments: A Compendium,  UN/UNCTAD, New York and 
Geneva, 1996; Lipson, 1985, pp.86-90 
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1 * Ngaire Woods urged me to revise my study of the ITO for publication, along with Sol 
Picciotto who has shared his knowledge of international investment regimes with me, both have 
been very helpful in reworking my original ideas. Neither are responsible for the final product. 
This paper was originally written during my sabbatical leave in 1997, when I was a visiting 
professor in the Canadian Studies Centre, at the University of Western Sydney and in the 
Department of Geography at Macquarie University, Australia. An earlier version was presented at 
the University of Woolongong, June 1997 and at the Centre of International Studies, University of 
Toronto October, 1997. Louis Pauly, Peter Groenewegen, Ed Dosman, Geoffrey Underhill and 
Chris Nyland all provided useful information and feedback. Jean-Christophe Graz also discussed 
the paper in detail and gave me some useful criticism in one of its many reiterations. Daniel 
Drache is the Director of the Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies and Professor of Political 
Economy at York University. Currently he is writing a book on full employment and free trade 
and comments on this paper are welcome and appreciated. By email he is reachable at: 
drache@yorku.ca or by fax: 1. 416. 736.5739   
1 One of the most forceful advocates of the need to liberate trade of its liberal ideology came 
unexpectedly from The Economist, itself a vocal and persistent champions of laissez-faire free 
trade. See the remarkable series of essays written during 1944;1945;1946 addressing the future of 
trade and employment in the postwar world.  
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, New 
York: United Nations, Sales No 1948 II.D.4.1, 1948. 
3 Hundreds of officials were involved in its creation and there are 100 volumes of transcribed 
minutes of deliberations. There is an extensive literature on the ITO.  For the American side of the 
story consult, W.A. Brown Jr.(1950). The United States and the Restoration of World Trade. An 
Analysis and Appraisal of the ITO Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Washington D.C.; The Brookings Institution; Clair Wilcox, (1949). A Charter for World Trade. 
New York: MacMillan; William Diebold Jr. (1952). The End of the ITO. Essays in International 
Finance No.16. Princeton, Princeton University ; R. Gardiner. (1956). Sterling Dollar Diplomacy: 
Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade. New York, OUP. 
Three recent articles that should not be missed are: William Diebold,. “Reflections on the 
International Trade Organization.” Northern Illinois University Law Review 14:2(Spring): 335-
346, 1994 and a second by Diebold, From the ITO to GATT -- And Back? The Bretton Woods-
GATT System Retrospect and Prospect After Fifty Years. Orin Kirshner. (Ed.). New York:, M.E. 
Sharpe: 152-173, 1994. John Odell and Barry Eichengreen have added substantially to our 
understanding of why the ITO did not receive Truman’s political support “The United States, the 
ITO and the WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack, and Presidential Leadership.” in The WTO as an 
International Organization. Ann. O. Krueger. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
Steve Charnovitz has provided important analysis of the place of labour standards and the ITO’s 
institutional link to the ILO in “Trade, Employment and Labour Standards.” Temple International 
and Comparative Law Journal 11: 131-163, 1997 and  “Promoting Higher Labour Standards.” 
The Washington Quarterly 18:3: 167-190, 1995. For a non-American examination of the first two 
decades of multilateralism, a very useful source is Karin Kock, (1969). International Trade Policy 
and the GATT 1947-1967. Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell; From the ‘Toronto’ school of 
international relations, there are a number of studies that are helpful. See particularly Eric 
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Helleiner,  (1993). When Finance Was the Servant: International Capital Movements in the 
Bretton Woods Order. In Finance and World Politics. Philip Cerny ed. London, Edward Elger 
Publishing: 20-48.and Helleiner (1995). From Bretton Woods to Global Finance. In Political 
Economy and the Changing Global Order. Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill eds. Toronto: 
McClelland &Stewart: 163-175. Louis Pauly,  (1997). Who Elected the Bankers? Surveillance and 
Control in the World Economy. Cornell: Cornell University Press. For useful  background  on the 
regulation of investment rights see, Charles Lipson, (1985). Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign 
Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Jackson, John (1992). The World Trading System. Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press. For a more 
contemporary discussion of international property rights, consult S. Picciotto, (1998). 
“Globalization, Liberalization, Regulation.” unpublished paper. For contemporary analysis of 
these events see Charles S, Maier,  (1981). “The Two Postwar Eras and Conditions for Stability in 
Twentieth Century Western Europe.”American Historical Review 86(April): 327-352.1973; Barry 
Eichengreen, (1996). Globalizing Capital A History of the International Monetary System. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; John Ikenberry, (1992). “A World Economy Restored: 
Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement.” International Organization 
46:1(winter): 289-321; Charles S. Maier,  (1981). “The Two Postwar Eras and Conditions for 
Stability in Twentieth Century Western Europe.” American Historical Review 86(April): 327-352; 
John G. Ruggie,(1982). “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism 
in the Postwar Economic Order.” International Organization 36 (Spring), 379-415 and his more 
recent article(1992). “Multilateralism: an Anatomy of an Institution.” International Organization 
46:3(summer): 573-598. A helpful retrospective analysis of the Bretton Woods era by participants 
is found in Keith Acheson, John F. Chant, et al., eds. (1972). Bretton Woods Revisited. Toronto: U 
of T. Finally there is a very large literature on full employment obligation including Philip 
Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, et al. (1991). Capitalism Since 1945. London: Basil Blackwell; 
Henderson, Hubert Douglas (1955). The Inter-War Years and Other Papers  A Selection from the 
Writings of Hubert Douglas Henderson. Oxford: OUP; James Meade, (1953). Problems of 
Economic Union. London: George Allen & Unwin as well as the writings of Keynes. For the latter 
Robert Sidelesky,  (1994). John Maynard Keynes The Economist as Saviour 1920-1937 
4 For a particularly influential work on the full employment imperative internationally, see 
Schumacher 1944. Much later his influential work Small is Beautiful established his international 
reputation as a practical utopian.  
5 Havana was broadly representative of the countries of the world at the time. Half  came from 
Latin America and Asia and ten from the Middle East or Africa, with the remaining signatories 
from First World countries. (Charnovitz, 1995) 
6 We now understand the complex issue of the failure of the Truman government  to muster the 
necessary domestic support to win Congressional approval for the ITO. By 1949, the highwater 
mark of US internationalism had passed and the Truman administration had begun to devote its 
energies to the more immediate military-political threats on its foreign policy agenda such as 
getting Congressional support for the Marshall Plan and NATO. (Odell and Eichengreen 1996) 
Without  high level Presidential support for the ITO, most major American business organizations 
turned against its  investment provisions. (Diebold, 1952; 1998)  
7 In terms of political theory, the defining element for government was interpreted to mean 
"…how much responsibility will be left to private enterprise and how much will be assumed by 
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public authority.”. 
8 The list is adapted from Viner, (1947). 
9 There had been international meetings and congresses to promote customs co-ordination in 1900, 
1908, and 1913. As well Conferences were held throughout the twenties in 1920, 1922, 1923, 
1927, 1930 and 1933. The League of Nations completed an International Convention Relating to 
the Simplification of Customs Formalities which Jackson notes “covered  many of the matters 
now treated in GATT.” As well, the League carried out a series of studies on trade problems 
between 1926 and 1936 which influenced the drafters of the Havana Charter. (Jackson,1989:31)   
10 Odell and Eichengreen make a powerful case that it was not the investment provisions that 
prevented Truman from supporting the Havana Charter. Rather it was the fact that Truman did not 
mobilize public opinion on its behalf and had other foreign policy priorities that his 
Administration deemed more important. American business interests had been early supporters of 
the ITO but as the Cold War heated up their position changed from support to opposition. Not all 
of US business were anti-ITO zealots though and in retrospect it would appear that the ITO could 
have passed had Truman used his executive authority and congressional muscle. 
11 According to the Charter, a member State targeted for retaliation was indeed free to withdraw 
from the ITO within 60 days.(art. 6,21, 75, 93-5) But if the GATT experience is any guide, it is 
doubtful that  a country would exercise the ‘exit’ option. In practice, countries have always  
preferred to negotiate their differences rather than become an international outrider. In this sense, 
the ITO was built better than it realized and its mechanism to handle trade disputes remains within 
the international norms of the last fifty years. 
12 The three aims of the Geneva meeting were: “continuing the preparation of the charter; 
negotiation of a multilateral agreement of tariff reduction; drafting “general clauses of obligations 
related to tariff negotiation.” (Ostry, 1997: 62) Plainly, GATT was the creature of the ITO and its 
principles and legal norms were developed as part of the larger organization’s mandate and non-
liberal philosophy. 
13 The contentious subject of investment rights did not die with the end of the ITO.   
 
14 At the World Bank, the US had a fifth of the voting power, the EEC almost a quarter and  
OECD nations close to 60 percent. Capital rich nations comprised 16 percent of the membership 
in 1982 but four times the votes! It is not difficult to see why, as a consequence of these voting 
arrangements, after the disappearance of the ITO, the World Bank and the IMF have supported the 
rights of foreign investors and have condemned international behaviour that extends host 
countries’ rights to maintain control over their resources. (Lipson, 1985:90-91)    
15 See Brown, 1950:Chapter VII for the pros and cons of this debate which has never had any 
closure.  
16 Jackson underscores the fact that the US was one of the most insistent countries in maintaining  
trade flexibility practices. The modern era of safeguards legislation began with the US Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements program of 1934 and is still one of the pillars of US trade policy sixty-odd 
years later. Its evolution can be seen in other US statutes such as the US Reciprocal Trade  
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Agreement in the US-Mexico Agreement of 1943. Jackson adds that the GATT escape clause 
(Article XIX) is a direct descendent of the safeguard clause in the US-Mexico Agreement. 
(Jackson: 1989:153)   
17 By contrast, with the passage of time US law was to become ‘increasingly more detailed and 
elaborate’ with very precise definitions. Even here the US has had the decisive advantage of 
relying on its own parallel legal norms to protect US interests by using its trade laws for restrictive 
protectionist ends.  
18 Since GATT was not an ‘organization at the time’, its status was that of a negotiating forum of 
the ITO. GATT membership and a full secretariat came much later. (Jackson, 1989:45) 
19 The system of tariff negotiation pioneered by the ITO and the GATT had its limitations. Item by 
item negotiations were lengthy and difficult and many countries gave away as little as possible. It 
was complicated by the fact that tariff concessions were measured by the height of the existing 
tariff. At the Kennedy Round, countries adopted a linear across the board method of tariff 
reduction based on the commitment to reduce tariffs by the same amount for all. Another model of 
tariff reduction consists of attempting to liberalize trade within a given sector such as steel, 
automobile or refrigerators. Aside from many technical problems associated with defining the 
‘sector’,  tariff reduction depends in the final analysis on political will and the capacity to generate 
sufficient momentum. It is the latter two ingredients that account for the success of the ITO-GATT 
negotiations of 1947.  
20 For a discussion of the reasons for the weak dispute settlement in GATT, see Jackson, 1989:94-
103.  
21 Voluntary codes are a poor second best choice by any standard to address this issue. Two such 
efforts are: 1976 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the 1980 UNCTAD set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices. 
22 Countries in the postwar period were engaged in different kinds of national planning exercises 
that required them to address many of the same issues of full employment, trade and investment 
domestically. In Britain the Labour Party had won the general election in 1945 and had committed 
itself to a  full employment obligation. Even the Conservatives backed the full employment 
provision in the 1947 Industrial Charter. (Weir, 80 in Peter Hall, 1989) In 1946 France established 
‘planification’ the system of prioritizing and expanding state control over the economy and its first 
head with Jean Monnet. In the US,  planning, trade and employment questions were also priorities 
even though the mechanisms and the commitments undertaken by Washington were weaker than 
Whitehall’s. see, Armstrong et.al.1991.  
 
